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NOTE
RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF
FACIALLY NEUTRAL PRACTICES-WHAT
APPROACH UNDER 42 U.S.C.
SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982?
During the past ten years the Supreme Court has rendered several
important decisions concerning the elements of a prima facie case of race
discrimination.I One of the still unanswered questions in this area is whether
a plaintiff alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 19812 or 19823 must
1. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discriminatory intent proved by a
showing that Mexican-Americans constituted only 39 percent of those called for grand jury
duty over an 11 year period in a county with a 79 percent Mexican-American population);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the equal
protection clause); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (section 1981
prohibits racial discrimination against white as well as non-white persons); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, non-sectarian
schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are black); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the equal protection clause as applied through the fifth amendment);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing four-pronged test for
prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (Title VII forbids the use of neutral practices with racially disproportionate effects
unless they are job related); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (section 1982
provides a remedy against purely private acts of race discrimination).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), entitled "Equal rights under the law," provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
Despite the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 253, which was designed as a comprehensive plan to combat discrimination in employ-
ment, section 1981 (which is most widely applicable to employment contracts) nonetheless
remains an important statute. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975),
the Court held that Title VII had neither repealed nor restricted section 1981. See note 51 infra.
Section 1981 is an independent remedy that can be applied to contracts outside of the employ-
ment area, see, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (contractual relationship of
private school and prospective student), and can also be used to fill in the gaps left by the three
major exemptions of Title VII: employers of less than 15 employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1970), private membership clubs with less than 25 employees, id., and religious groups
employing workers in religion-oriented jobs, id. § 2000e-l.
Furthermore, section 1981's procedures and remedies are often preferable to those of Title
VII. In contrast to Title VII, a section 1981 plaintiff may file a complaint immediately without
having to exhaust any administrative remedies. Furthermore, the section 1981 statute of
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always prove discriminatory intent or, instead, may in appropriate circum-
stances rely solely upon a showing of racially disproportionate impact. 4 It is
limitations is based on the most relevant state statute of limitations, which, in some cases, may
be several years longer than that of Title VII. See 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §
48.10, at 10-2 (1975). Moreover, although Title VII authorizes the court to utilize a broad range
of equitable remedies, see id. §§ 54.00-55.00, the only legal relief available to the litigant is an
award of up to two years worth of back pay. See id. §§ 55.30, .37. Compensatory and
punitive damages are not available tinder Title VII. See id. § 55.00. Under section 1981, on the
other hand, the full range of legal and equitable remedies, including compensatory and punitive
damages, is available. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), entitled "Property rights of citizens," provides that:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.
Despite the passage of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, section 1982 is still important because it is applicable to
transactions involving personal as well as real property and it is capable of reaching those
transactions exempted from the reach of Title VIII: the sale or rental of a single family dwelling
if effected without the services of a professional realtor or public advertising and if the owner
of the dwelling does not own an interest in more than three such dwellings and has not invoked
such an exemption within the previous twenty-four month period; the rental of rooms or units in
a dwelling, in which the owner resides and in which not more than four families reside
independently of each other, 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970); and the rental of rooms by religious
groups and private clubs to their own members, id. § 3607.
Section 1982 does not provide clear-cut advantages over Title VIII with respect to proce-
dures and remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970) does establish a very restrictive procedure similar
to the complex procedure of Title VII. However, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970) provides an alterna-
tive for the individual, allowing him to immediately file a federal district court action which may
proceed without regard to any administrative proceedings initiated under section 3610. See
Miller v. Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1976); Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
Despite their slightly different derivations, see note 46 infra, sections 1981 and 1982 have
been given a parallel interpretation by the Supreme Court. The Court first indicated that it
would do so in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), in which it explicated section
1982. The Court discussed an older decision in which the Supreme Court had held that the
predecessor to section 1981 was applicable only to state action. Instead of merely distinguishing
that case, the Court expressly overruled it, thus establishing a parallel interpretation for the two
sections. See id. at 441 n.78. This initial disposition was solidified by the Court's decision in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("it would be
most incongruous to give those two sections a fundamentally different construction").
The language "as is enjoyed by white citizens" that is contained in both sections 1981 and
1982 was interpreted by the Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
285-96 (1976), as the definition of the quality of the rights bestowed. This language does not
limit the protection of these two statutes to non-whites. Rather, it establishes a broad principle
that guarantees to whites as well as minorities that they shall enjoy the same right to contract
and hold property as is enjoyed by those persons who exercise the greatest legal freedom in
those areas-traditionally, white citizens. See text accompanying notes 60-66, infra.
4. An allegation of racial discrimination may take either of two forms. The first is an
allegation of disparate treatment-that the defendant has treated the plaintiff less favorably
than others because of the plaintiff's race. The second form, disproportionate impact, alleges a
less obvious type of racial discrimination. It charges that the defendant has discriminated
against the plaintiff by utilizing, in a racially neutral manner, a selection device or criterion that,
although racially neutral on its face, nonetheless operates to the detriment of a disproportionate
number of minority persons. The most common facially neutral selection device is the employ-
ment test. But neutral practices also include such things as requirements for minimum height
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now settled that a plaintiff may state a cause of action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19645 simply by proving that he was damaged by the
operation of an employment practice that, although neutral on its face, is
shown to have a racially disproportionate impact. 6 Conversely, in order to
state a claim under the equal protection clause a plaintiff must produce proof
of the defendant's intent to discriminate. 7
This Note will contrast the Title VII and constitutional approaches to
allegations of racially disproportionate impact, examine the language and
legislative histories of sections 1981 and 1982 through a review of the
Supreme Court's treatment of those statutes, and discuss the relevant legal
arguments on the issue of which standard should be applied to dispropor-
tionate impact cases under sections 1981 and 1982. The Note will conclude
that the Title VII approach should be adopted for such cases.
and weight, minimum educational attainment, absence of an arrest record and maintenance of a
good credit rating.
A case involving disparate treatment necessarily contains an allegation of real or subjective
intent to discriminate. At the heart of a charge that the defendant treated the plaintiff less
favorably than others because of the plaintiff's race is the assumption that the defendant knew
the plaintiff's race and that this knowledge motivated the challenged action. Recent Supreme
Court decisions clearly establish that in order to state a cause of action under the equal
protection clause or Title VII, a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must produce proof of
invidious motivation. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n.15 (1977) (Title VII); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (equal protection clause).
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue of intent under sections 1981 and
1982, dicta in recent disparate treatment cases under section 1981 indicate that the Court will
apply the same approach in these cases that it has taken in equal protection and Title VII
disparate treatment cases. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court
discussed section 1982 with reference to its origin in section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, and concluded that "the structure of the 1866 Act, as well as its
language, points to the conclusion urged by the petitioners in this case-that § 1. was meant to
prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights enumerated in the statute." 392 U.S. at
426 (emphasis added; emphasis on "all" deleted). This is a strong indication of the Court's
thinking as to the character of the actions prohibited by the Act, and is solidified by a similar
discussion found in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), another case involving allegations
of disparate treatment. There the Court, while discussing section 1981 by reference to section 1
of the 1866 Act, stated that
fjiust as in Jones a Negro's § I right to purchase property on equal terms with whites
was violated when a private person refused to sell to the prospective purchaser solely
because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's § 1 right to "make and enforce contracts"
is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a
Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.
Id. at 170-71 (emphasis added). This result seems to be mandated by the definition of a
disparate treatment charge; that the defendant acted as he did because of plaintiff's race
necessarily implies action motivated by discriminatory feelings-that is, subjective intent.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
6. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 21-31 infra and
accompanying text.
7. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977). See notes 8-20 infra and accompanying text.
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I. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND TITLE VII
In Washington v. Davis' the Supreme Court strongly disapproved the
notion that a showing of racially disproportionate impact, standing alone,
would state a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause. After
noting that the fifth and fourteenth amendments serve the important purpose
of preventing racial discrimination in "official conduct," 9 the Court ex-
pressed a concern that the furtherance of that purpose by use of the Title VII
standard would be far outweighed by the concomitant disruption in the
functioning of government.10 Application of a disproportionate impact stan-
dard under the equal protection clause "would be far reaching and would
raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax,
welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes." 1
Disproportionate impact was thus said to be relevant, but only for the
purpose of proving the presence of subjective discriminatory intent. 12 Since
direct evidence of subjective intent is rarely present, "an invidious dis-
criminatory purpose [must] often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
8. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
9. Id. at 239.
10. Id. at 248.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 242. The statement in Davis that "our cases have not embraced the proposition
that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact," id. at 239,
should not be taken to mean that disproportionate impact by itself can never prove discrimina-
tory intent. The Court in Davis went on to make clear that in some situations a showing of
disproportionate impact will be so suspicious as to constitute proof of intent:
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more
heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discrimina-
tory impact . . . may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality be-
cause in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on
nonracial grounds.
Id. at 242. What emerges from the cases following Davis is the principle that the showing of
disproportionate impact will be accorded different probative value on the issue of intent
according to the circumstances under which it occurs. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court held that invidious
purpose could not be attributed to a local zoning board simply because its denial of a rezoning
request would effectively scuttle a low income housing project and thus have a disproportionate
impact on blacks. See id. at 268-71. In several school integration cases the Court has held that
the disparate racial compositions of various schools within the same district must be
corroborated by other evidence showing that this pattern resulted from intentionally segrega-
tive actions of the school board. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977);
United States v. School Comm'rs of Indianapolis, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) (per curiam) (vacating
and remanding for further consideration in light of Arlington Heights). But with respect to jury
selection, the Court has held that discriminatory intent was proved by a showing that Mexican-
Americans constituted only 39% of those called for grand jury duty over an I l-year period in a
county with a 79% Mexican-American population. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1977).
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facts." 13 Evidence of disproportionate impact is merely one of the relevant
facts to be considered, and, like any other evidence, it varies in probative
value according to the particular facts and circumstances. The Court noted
that in a few instances, such as the exclusion of blacks from juries, the
showing of disproportionate impact by itself "may for all practical purposes
demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the dis-
crimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds."14
The Court has expanded this approach to the equal protection clause
beyond the area of employment discrimination, applying it to zoning 5 and
school desegregation. 16 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp. 17 the Court outlined several circumstantial
factors that might be used to establish the presence of subjective discrimina-
tory intent. The historical background of the defendant may be revealing,
particularly if it contains other instances of racial discrimination that are
similar to the challenged action. i8 "The specific sequence of events leading
up to the challenged [action] also may shed some light on the [defendant's]
purpose." 1 9 Departures from normal procedures may lend credence to the
plaintiff's charges. 20 In short, a wide variety of circumstances, including
disproportionate impact, may in a particular case logically tend to prove the
existence of discriminatory intent.
Several years prior to Davis, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,21 the
Supreme Court had stunned the business world22 by announcing that Title
VII forbids the use of "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation" 23 unless the employer meets the heavy burden of proving that the
13. 426 U.S. at 242.
14. Id. See note 12 supra.
15. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause").
16. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977) ("The finding that the
pupil population in the various Dayton schools is not homogeneous, standing by itself, is not a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that this condition resulted
from intentionally segregative actions on the part of the Board").
17. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
18. Id. at 266-68.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. For a discussion of the impact of Griggs on the use of employment tests, see 3 A.
LARSON, supra note 2, at § 75.22.
23. 401 U.S. at 431. The Court examined the statute's legislative history and concluded that
the purpose of Congress was "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other
impermissible classification." Id. Accordingly, the Court held that
good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment proce-
dures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups
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practice is job related.24 The plaintiff alleging disproportionate impact need
not show that the practice was motivated by discriminatory intent. In fact,
absence of discriminatory intent or presence of good intent will not save a
challenged practice if the employer cannot demonstrate that the practice
relates to job performance. 25
An explanation for the irrelevance of subjective intent may be found by
examining the nature of the alleged wrongdoing. In a case of disparate
treatment, the discrimination is produced by the invidiously motivated
wrongful act of the individual defendant. By contrast, in the disproportion-
ate impact situation, the defendant's actions are taken without discriminat-
ory motivation, 26 and are directed toward the screening out of incompetent
job applicants. That the neutral test utilized screens out a disproportionate
percentage of blacks27 is not a result of any individual wrongful act of the
and are unrelated to measuring job capability. . .. Congress directed the thrust of
the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.
More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.
Id. at 432.
24. The process of proving job relatedness is referred to as validation. Validation can be
accomplished by three methods: criterion, content and construct. Criterion validation compares
the individual's performance according to the test or other neutral selection device with that
individual's subsequent job performance. Content validation simply looks at the test itself and
evaluates the relevance of the qualities measured to the job function. The classic example is the
typing test for secretaries. Construct validation is an elusive concept that seems to be just
content validation directed at psychological or other similarly intangible characteristics. For a
thorough discussion of validation see 3 A. LARSON, supra note 2, at §§ 77.00-78.00.
25. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
26. Justice Stevens has expressed the belief that not all cases will fit neatly into one of
these two categories: "mhe line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is
not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might
assume." Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring). This is true with respect to alleged
contitutional violations, for which proof of disproportionate impact is evaluated as proof of
discriminatory intent. The probative value of that showing of impact will vary according to the
circumstances in which it occurs, see note 12 supra, and thus there will be no bright line
between situations in which a showing of impact alone will suffice and those situations in which
evidence of impact must be buttressed by other evidence of the defendant's intent.
But this statement is misleading to the extent that it implies that some Title VII cases may
properly assume either category at any time as a procedural and evidentiary matter. Under Title
VII, impact and intent are two distinct theories. Due to the liberal rules of alternative pleading,
both may be considered in the same case with respect to the same set of facts. The two theories
should not, however, be indiscriminately mixed together. A showing of the disproportionate
impact of a neutral device states a prima facie case. Corresponding to this lesser initial burden
for the plaintiff is the job relatedness defense available to the defendant. A plaintiff alleging
disparate treatment must meet a higher standard to state a prima facie case by producing
evidence of discriminatory intent. And, under this theory of liability the defendant does not
have the defense of job relatedness. Disproportionate impact may, of course, be used as part of
the plaintiff's evidence on the issue of intent. But this should not be confused with the fact that
there exists a separate theory under which liability may follow from just a showing of dispro-
portionate impact.
27. The disproportionate impact approach announced in Griggs, see note 23 supra, should
be regarded as applicable only when the neutral criterion operates to the disadvantage of a
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defendant. Rather, this effect-poor performance on a standardized test-
can be directly linked to the historically inferior educational and cultural
opportunities available to blacks28-a societal rather than an individual
wrong.2 9 Thus the Griggs approach can be seen as being designed to
minimize the present effects of past evils, the socially fostered vestiges of
slavery. For this purpose the subjective intent of the individual defendant is
irrelevant. 30 The focus is on the inherent inequality of the facially neutral
test and the issue is whether, as a matter of social policy, the use of the test
in each particular situation is desirable. If there are facts that might justify
the use of the test, the defendant must provide them. Because the use of
practices with discriminatory effect is disfavored, the defendant's obligation
has been structured as a burden of proof that, if not met, will cause the
prohibition of continued use of the test.31
This discussion also sheds some light on the Davis decision. 32 The
Supreme Court there declined to apply the Griggs approach because to do so
would raise serious issues of public policy that are traditionally the province
of the legislature. Given the pervasive and disruptive consequences that
such a shifted burden of proof could have for the functioning of the
minority. When the Griggs Court discussed neutral practices with racially disproportionate
effects, it did so with the assumption that the effects would be discriminatory against the
minority. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII. . .was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees." 401 U.S. at 429-30. Consequent-
ly the Court referred to "employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-
in headwinds' for minority groups." Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
28. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
29. Cf. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15 (1971) (distinguishing institutional and
individual discrimination).
30. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring): "I do not rely at all on the
evidence of good-faith efforts to recruit black police officers. In my judgment, neither these
efforts nor the subjective good faith of the District administration, would save Test 21 if it were
otherwise invalid."
31. Another way of reaching this explanation of the irrelevance of the defendant's intent is
through analysis of the structure of the Griggs litigation. The case came to the Supreme Court
after the lower courts had found that the neutral practice had been adopted without any
discriminatory intent. See 401 U.S. at 432. The crucial point that the Court failed to note was
that job relatedness would not even have been in issue had the lower courts found that the
practice had been adopted with discriminatory intent. That this is true is due to the structure of
the burdens of proof involved. The plaintiff has the initial burden of making out a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing a disparity drawn along racial lines. See Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). In order to avail himself of the job relatedness defense, the
defendant must first prove that the neutral procedure which produced the disparity was adopted
without any discriminatory purpose. The defendant's subjective intent, having already been
determined, is not then relevant to the job relatedness defense. This remaining issue is strictly a
policy determination of whether the business necessity of the neutral device in the particular
situation outweighs the desire of society to eliminate the vestiges of slavery.
32. See text accompanying notes 8-14 supra.
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government, 33 the Court felt that the Griggs approach should only be
applied to those areas indicated by Congress. 34 The question thus becomes
whether Congress intended that a Griggs-type approach be used under
sections 1981 and 1982. The following discussion will examine the Su-
preme Court's treatment of these two statutes in an attempt to discover the
relevant legislative intent.
II. TREATMENT OF SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982 BY THE SUPREME COURT
For almost a century, sections 1981 and 1982 lay dormant because
they were assumed to have been intended to apply only to state action.35
Then, in 1968, the Supreme Court breathed new life into these disregarded
statutes by holding that section 1982 was applicable to purely private
actions. Writing for a majority of seven in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. ,36
Mr. Justice Stewart reaffirmed that section 1982 was derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,37 sidestepped previous Supreme Court cases dealing
with the statute, 38 and held, on the basis of the legislative history of the 1866
Act, that that statute was intended by Congress to reach private as well as
public acts of racial discrimination. 39 Mr. Justice Harlan, joined in his
dissent by Justice White, agreed that section 1982 had originated in the 1866
Act,4° but disputed that the conclusions of the majority could be drawn from
the plain language of the statute41 or from the legislative history of the 1866
33. See text accompanying note I 1 supra.
34. "In our view, extension of the [disproportionate impact] rule beyond those areas where
it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should
await legislative prescription." 426 U.S. at 248.
35. Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in
Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56, 57 (1972).
36. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
37. Id. at 422.
38. Id. at 417-20. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), was distinguished as having not
involved purely private actions; dicta in Hurd stating that section 1982 was directed only
toward "governmental action," id. at 31, was discounted. Dicta to the same effect in two older
cases, State of Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317-18 (1880), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883), were similarly distinguished by reference to the actual holdings of the
cases. 392 U.S. at 420 n.25.
Justice Harlan took exception to this cavalier treatment of the Court's own precedents. Id.
at 450-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the Court had, less than two decades after
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, quite clearly characterized that act in dictum as
being directed only at state action: "This law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to
counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs having the
force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified .. " Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
16-17 (1883), quoted in 392 U.S. at 451 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. 392 U.S. at 422-36.
40. Id. at 453.
41. Sections 1981 and 1982 are both phrased so as to grant to all persons "the same right
• .. as is enjoyed by white citizens" to do enumerated acts. See notes 2 & 3 supra. Justice
Harlan pointed out that "there is an inherent ambiguity in the term 'right' as used in § 1982."
392 U.S. at 452-53.
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Act. 42 Justice Harlan's opinion argued that the 39th Congress was prompted
to pass the 1866 Act by concern about discriminatory actions that were
primarily state-connected, either as official governmental acts or as acts
performed with the acquiescence and support of governmental authority. 43
The next important development occurred in Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. ,44 in which the Court in dictum approved the holdings of
several circuit courts of appeals45 that section 1981 also applied to purely
private acts. The Court's treatment of this issue was superficial and did not
focus on the origin of section 1981, about which there is considerable
controversy. 46 In fact, successive paragraphs on the same page of the
The "right" referred to may either be a right to equal status under the law, in which
case the statute operates only against state-sanctioned discrimination, or it may be an
"absolute" right enforceable against private individuals. To me, the words of the
statute, taken alone, suggest the former interpretation, not the latter.
Id. at 453 (footnote omitted).
42. 392 U.S. at 454-73.
43. Id. at 449-80; see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 289 (1976),
quoted in text accompanying note 65 infra.
44. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
45. Those decisions are listed at 421 U.S. at 459 n.6. But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 172 (1976) (characterizing this aspect of Johnson as a holding rather than a dictum).
46. The genesis of both section 1981 and section 1982 was section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, which was passed pursuant to the enforcement clause of the
thirteenth amendment. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 201-02 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting); Jones, 392 U.S. at 437-38. However, there is authority for the proposition that the
current form of section 1981 is derived from the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat.
140, 144, which was enacted under the fourteenth amendment. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 202
(White, J., dissenting). Section 16 of the 1870 Act states:
[T]hat all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding.
(emphasis added). Thus, it contains language that is identical to the current text of section 1981
(emphasized in the above quotation, with the exception that section 1981 reads "to no other" in
place of "none other"). See note 2 supra. On the other hand, the language of section I of the
1866 Act states:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;
and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal proper-
ty, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Comparison reveals that it is slightly different from the current text of section 1981. But, on the
other hand, section 18 of the 1870 Act, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144, expressly re-enacts the whole
of the 1866 Act and stipulates that the provisions of section 16 of the 1870 Act, supra, should be
"enforced according to the provisions of [the 1866 Act.]" Id. This confusing situation was not
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opinion identify the 1866 Act47 and section 16 of the Enforcement Act of
187048 as the source of section 1981.4 Because the Court's holding was that
the filing of an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC)50 does not toll the section 1981 statute of
limitations, much of the majority's opinion was devoted to establishing that
section 1981 is independent of and unaffected by the Civil Rights Act of
1964.51 The justices who had dissented in Jones joined in the opinion,
feeling that the narrowness of the actual holding had preserved for another
day the issue of the applicability of section 1981 to private acts. 52
This acquiescence was not present, however, in the recent case of
Runyon v. McCrary,53 in which the five-member majority held that section
1981 prohibits a private, commercially operated, non-sectarian school from
denying admission to prospective students because of their race.54 The Court
held that section 1981 is derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
clarified by the codification of federal laws that was undertaken in the early 1870's. Regarding
the codification generally see Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 n.8. That effort culminated in the
enactment of Revised Statutes of 1874, §§ 1977 and 1978, the immediate predecessors of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, respectively. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 422 n.28. The codification
committee, in the "historical note" appended to each section, indicated that R.S. § 1977 was
derived from section 16 of the 1870 Act while R.S. § 1978 was drawn from section I of the 1866
Act. The correctness of this annotation and the source of section 1981 have spawned con-
siderable controversy. See notes 57-59 infra and accompanying text.
47. See note 46 supra.
48. See note 46 supra.
49. See 421 U.S. at 459.
50. Regarding EEOC procedures, see 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, at §§ 48.00-50.00.
51. See 421 U.S. at 459-61. The Court convincingly showed that "[d]espite Title VII's
range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in
employment," id. at 459, the law had neither repealed nor narrowed earlier civil rights statutes.
"[ihe legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable
state and federal statutes." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S., at 48. In
particular, Congress noted "that the remedies available to the individual under Title
VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that the two procedures augment each
other and are not mutually exclusive." H.R. REP. No. 92-238, [92d Cong., 1st Sess.] P.
19 (1971). Later, in considering the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the
Senate rejected an amendment that would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue
under § 1981. 118 CoNo. REC. 3371-3373 (1972).
Id.
52. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192, 195 n.5, 213-14 (1976) (White, J., dis-
senting).
53. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
54. Id. at 168, 172. The Court first established that the conduct complained of "amount[ed]
to a classic violation of § 1981." Id. at 172. It then held that, as applied in this case, section 1981
did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the right of free association, id. at 175-76, the right to
privacy, id. at 177-79, or the right of parents to direct their child's education, id. at 176-77. For
further discussion of these issues, see Comment, Section 1981 After Runyon v. McCrary: The
Free Exercise Right of Private Sectarian Schools to Deny Admission to Blacks on Account of
Race, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1219; Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate
Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975).
1276
SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982
1866,55 which was interpreted in Jones as providing a remedy against purely
private acts of racial discrimination. 56 The historical note appended to
section 1981 that designates section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 187057 as
its source was dismissed as the result of a clerical error. 58 The majority then
argued that the entire issue of the origin and applicability of section 1981
had been settled in previous decisions. 59
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. ,60 decided the
55. 427 U.S. at 168-70.
56. See notes 36-43 supra and accompanying text.
57. See note 46 supra.
58. 427 U.S. at 168 n.8.
59. Id. at 168-72. Justice White, dissenting, argued that the portion of Johnson relied on by
the majority was dictum. Id. at 213-14. He also claimed that other cases cited by the majority
had never addressed the issue of the applicability of section 1981 to private actions. See id.
Justice White further argued that the codification of the Revised Statutes in 1874 had
repealed, by clear and unambiguous language, all statutes not included within the Revised
Statutes. The historical note clearly identified section 16 of the 1870 Act as the source of R.S. §
1977 and this could not properly be dismissed so easily as clerical error. See 427 U.S. at 205-10.
Furthermore, he noted that the language of section 1981 is identical to that of section 16 of the
1870 Act but slightly different from that of section 1 of the 1866 Act. See id. at 195-97 n.6; note
46 supra. Also, Justice White stressed that section 1981 refers to "all persons" while section
1982 is directed toward "all citizens." He noted that "persons" includes aliens, who clearly
were not among those whom Congress sought to protect from the badges and incidents of
slavery. Thus, he concluded that section 1981 must be derived from section 16 of the 1870 Act,
which refers to persons, rather than from section 1 of the 1866 Act, which refers to citizens. 427
U.S. at 195-97 n.6, 202-05. See note 46 supra.
Justice White's substantive analysis of section 1981 turned on an examination of the right
to contract. He argued that "it is and always has been central to the very concept of a 'contract'
that there be 'assent by the parties .... " 427 U.S. at 194. Thus, he reasoned:
The right to make contracts, enjoyed by white citizens, was therefore always a right to
enter into binding agreements only with willing second parties. Since the statute only
gives Negroes the "same rights" to contract as is enjoyed by whites, the language of
the statute confers no right on Negroes to enter into a contract with an unwilling
person no matter what that person's motivation for refusing to contract. What is
conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is the right-which was enjoyed by whites-"to make
contracts" with other willing parties and to "enforce" those contracts in court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Justice White also noted that the Court had, within two decades of the enactment, twice
referred in dictum to R.S. § 1977 (section 1981) as being directed only toward equality under the
law-that is, toward state related actions. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883), quoted in Runyon, 427 U.S. at 202-04 (White, J.,
dissenting).
The White argument drew the support, but not the votes, of Justices Powell and Stevens.
Justice Powell stated that
[i]f the slate were clean I might well be inclined to agree with Mr. Justice White that §
1981 was not intended to restrict private contractual choices. Much of the review of
the history and purpose of this statute set forth in his dissenting opinion is quite
persuasive. It seems to me, however, that it comes too late.
427 U.S. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stevens was even stronger in his support of
Justice White, stating that "[flor me the problem in these cases is whether to follow a line of
authority which I firmly believe to have been incorrectly decided." Id. at 189 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
60. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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same day as Runyon, the Court expanded the scope of section 1981 even
farther by holding that it forbids private acts of racial discrimination that are
directed against white persons. 61 The Court rejected the argument that the
phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" 62 that is contained in section 1981
should limit the statute's protection to non-whites. 63 That phrase was
construed as being the standard used to illustrate the character of the rights
being protected. 64 And while the Court acknowledged that "the immediate
impetus for the bill was the necessity for further relief of the constitutionally
emancipated former Negro slaves," 65 it concluded that the purpose of
Congress was to establish a principle of racial equality benefitting all
persons-'"a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to
meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro
slaves. "66
From the discussions in the foregoing cases three facts may be ascer-
tained. First, the 39th Congress was prompted to act by concern for the
plight of blacks who needed protection from actions by whites that were
often state-sanctioned and always intentional. Second, the purpose of
Congress in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes was to establish
a forward-looking principle of racial equality broader than that strictly
necessary to eliminate the reactionary white conduct of that era. And finally,
the statutes that were enacted are phrased in very broad language that is
capable of being interpreted to cover situations that were not or could not
have been considered by the enacting Congress, but which nevertheless may
be included consistently with the remedial purpose underlying the statutes.
This conflict between the enacting Congress' conceptualization of the stat-
utes' coverage and the process of liberal statutory interpretation to effectuate
the statutes' underlying purpose is the major issue relevant to the applicabili-
ty of the Griggs disproportionate impact approach under sections 1981 and
1982.
III. USE OF THE GR/iGs APPROACH UNDER SECIONS 1981 AN 1982
The strongest argument against permitting a showing of disproportion-
ate impact to state a prima facie case under sections 1981 and 1982 is that
the legislative history of the statute from which these sections are derived 67
evidences a congressional intent to outlaw only those actions that were
61. Id. at 287.
62. This phrase appears in both sections 1981 and 1982. See notes 2-3 supra.
63. 427 U.S. at 286-96.
64. Id. at 287.
65. Id. at 289.
66. Id. at 296.
67. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 449-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
1278 [Vol. 1977:1267
SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982
performed with invidious discriminatory motivation. The Supreme Court
has already effected a "construction of the statute that would have amazed
the legislators who voted for it;" 68 further stretching of the much disputed
legislative history would be simply disingenuous.6 9 Did the Congress in
1866 or 1870 intend to render illegal and actionable conduct of private
individuals that, although racially neutral on its face, incidentally and
unintentionally resulted in racially disproportionate impacts upon contractu-
al relationships? The question seems to barely survive the asking. The
Reconstruction Congress was concerned with securing for recently emanic-
pated blacks the status of citizenship and the basic rights appurtenant
thereto. 70 The Acts were meant to deal with the most egregious forms of
68. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
69. [T]he language of the impassioned Reconstruction Era congressional debates is of
limited value today. Moreover, as many critics have pointed out, the seminal decision
in Jones has moved the Court so far from the original meaning of the 1866 Act that to
return to legislative intent for refinement of section 1981's current applicability would
be pointless.
Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. § 1981: Keeping a Compromised Promise of Equality to
Blacks, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 318, 324 (1977) (citations omitted).
70. Heated congressional debate occurred before the first sentence of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866; ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), was amended so as to declare explicitly and unequivocal-
ly that Negroes are citizens. One Senator voiced the opinion that the thirteenth amendment had
removed "the only obstacle in the way of citizenship" and that they had thus become citizens
automatically, although he acknowledged the difficulties presented for that argument by the
Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), in
which the Court held that the framers had not intended broadly phrased constitutional provi-
sions to include Negroes. See 36 CONG. GLOBE 506-07 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Johnson). But the
vast majority of congressmen assumed that Negores were not citizens. See, e.g., id. 497-98
(remarks of Sen. Van Winkle). Furthermore, several legislators contended that Congress did
not possess the power to make Negroes citizens and that a specific constitutional amendment
was necessary. See, e.g., id. 499 (remarks of Sen. Cowan) (the thirteenth amendment
empowered Congress to legislate only to enforce the liberation of the slaves and no more); id.
523-24 (remarks of Sen. Davis) (the congressional power to make persons citizens by naturaliza-
tion applies only to persons formerly foreigners who renounce allegiance to a foreign power; it
does not apply to non-citizens who have no prior foreign allegiance).
The very basic nature of S. 61, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. (1866), the bill that became the 1866
Act, is illustrated by the comments of the bill's sponsor, Senator Trumbull, and its most
outspoken opponent, Senator Davis. Senator Trumbull characterized the bill as "the most
important measure . . . since the . . . constitutional amendment abolishing slavery." He
stated that
this measure is intended to give effect to that declaration and secure to all persons
within the United States practical freedom. There is very little importance in the
general declaration of abstract truths and principles unless they can be carried into
effect. . . . Of what avail will it now be that the Constitution of the United States has
declared that slavery shall not exist, if in the late slaveholding States laws are to be
enacted and enforced depriving persons of African descent of privileges which are
essential to freemen?
It is the intention of this bill to secure those rights.
36 CONG. GLOBE 474 (1866). The fundamental character of the rights in question is apparent in
light of the attacks levelled by Senator Davis. He contended that "the whole subject of free
negroes and of slave negroes" was constitutionally the province of the states. 1d. at 530. He
stated that "[tihis is a Government and a political organization by white people. It is a principle
of that Government and that organization before and below the Constitution, that nobody but
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reactionary white conduct; 71 they were not intended to fashion an eviden-
tiary presumption designed to root out more subtle forms of discrimina-
tion. 72 Even if it is accepted that the legislative history of the two Acts
supports the Supreme Court's view that these laws were intended to regulate
private behavior, 73 it cannot seriously be argued that that legislative history
also supports the contention that Congress meant these laws to outlaw any
conduct with unintended racially disproportionate effects upon contracts. A
reading of the relevant congressional debates reveals absolutely nothing that
would lend credence to such a notion.74 On the contrary, these sources give
every indication that these laws were intended only to outlaw those actions
undertaken with invidious, discriminatory motivation.
75
The four lower federal courts that have addressed this issue since the
Davis decision, while taking two separate paths to reach the same conclu-
sion, have held that subjective intent must be proved under section 1981.76
Two of the courts were faced with suits filed against municipal governments
white people are or can be parties to it." Id. He contended that the power to amend the
Constitution did not include within it the "power to revolutionize," to "subvert" and to
"change our form of Government" by making Negroes citizens. Id.
71. The debates on the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, S. 60, 39th Cong., ist Sess. (1866), and the
Civil Rights Bill, S. 61, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866), are illustrative of this point. Supporters of
these measures recounted instances of beatings and murders of freedmen. See, e.g., 36 CONG.
GLOBE 339 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Creswell) ("combinations of returned rebel soldiers have
been formed for the express purpose of persecuting, beating most cruelly, and in some cases
actually murdering the returned colored soldiers of the Republic"). Also reported were
conspiracies to maintain, through the use of economic forces, the dependent and subservient
condition of the Negroes. For example, see the published agreement subscribed to by the
farmers of the James River, Virginia area that is included in the remarks of Representative
Eliot. Id. at 517. This agreement bound the signers to deal with freedmen laborers according to
a set of regulations that governed nearly every possible aspect of the employment relationship
and that forbade the hiring of a laborer who had been discharged by another of the signers. The
congressmen also placed great emphasis on the unabashed passage of laws designed to circum-
vent the thirteenth amendment and establish a system of de facto peonage. See id. 322, 340,
474-75, 516-17, 1123.
72. What was strived for was an equality of opportunity, particularly in the pursuit of the
basic necessities of life. The relatively limited character of the Civil Rights Bill is illustrated by
the fact that the bill's sponsor, Senator Trumbull, was repeatedly forced to reiterate that it
applied only to civil rights and did not include the question of Negro suffrage, see, e.g., 36
CONG. GLOBE 606 (1866), and would not have the effect of invalidating state anti-miscegenation
statutes, see, e.g., id. 505, 600.
73. See notes 36-39, 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
74. See the pages listed in the index, 36 CONG. GLOBE VIII (Civil Rights Bill, S. 61, 39th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1866) (Senate)), XIX (Freedmen's Bureau Bill, S. 60, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1866) (Senate)), LVIII (Civil Rights Bill (House)), LXVIII (Freedmen's Bureau Bill (House))
(1866).
75. See note 71 supra.
76. See City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976); Croker v. Boeing,
Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 431 F.
Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
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and, without analysis, assumed Davis to be the controlling precedent."
Two other courts analyzed the language and history of section 1981 and
concluded that its interpretation should parallel that of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
78
In Johnson v. Hoffman,79 a black who was refused induction into the
armed forces under a regulation that permitted rejection on a finding of
frequent encounters with law enforcement agencies filed suit seeking to
have the regulation invalidated as unconstitutional and violative of Title VII
and section 1981 because of its disproportionate impact upon blacks. The
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the armed forces
were not subject to Title VII and that the regulation was constitutional under
Davis because there was no showing of discriminatory intent.80 The court
then analyzed the language and history of section 1981 and held that the
question of intent was controlled by the constitutional standards of Davis.81
After reciting the language of section 1981, the court concluded that "[t]he
clear import of this statute is to provide for equal treatment under the
law." 82 The court noted that section 1981 was based upon section one of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,83 but placed much greater emphasis upon the fact
that Congress later incorporated much of the statute's language into the
fourteenth amendment. 84 This circumstance, coupled with the actual lan-
guage of section 1981, led the court to conclude that "claims under § 1981
parallel claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." 85
In Croker v. Boeing Co. ,86 a class action employment discrimination
case involving claims of both disparate treatment and disproportionate
impact, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania adopted
the arguments made by the court in Hoffman.87 The court further stated that
"[t]he language of § 1981, that 'all persons . . . [should] have the same
right . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws' clearly is parallel to the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' '88
This asserted parallelism of section 1981 and the fourteenth amend-
77. See City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976); Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
78. See Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Johnson v.
Hoffman, 424 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
79. 424 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
80. Id. at 493-94.





86. 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977).




ment seems convincing until one recalls the subject of the dispute between
the majority and dissenting justices in Jones and Runyon. In those two cases
the majorities, in order to avoid the fourteenth amendment's state action
requirement and apply the statutes to private parties, were forced to the
conclusion that sections 1981 and 1982 were enacted pursuant to the thir-
teenth amendment . 9
Upon closer inspection, however, the decisions in Jones and Runyon
do not undermine the fourteenth amendment-oriented arguments of Hoff-
man and Croker. The decision that those statutes were not enacted pursuant
to the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause determines only that they
are not, because of their origin, automatically subject to that amendment's
state action requirement. This determination does not logically preclude a
finding that the statutes are closely related to the fourteenth amendment;
likewise it does not compel a conclusion that the standards for interpretation
of these statutes must be different than the standards of the fourteenth
amendment. Had the Supreme Court held the statutes applicable only to
state action, proof of discriminatory intent would be indispensable. 90 But the
opposite holding with respect to applicability to private action does not
necessitate the opposite result with respect to intent, because the burden of
proving intent may be derived otherwise than as a concomitant of state
action. 91 Thus it is logically consistent to find that the intent of Congress
was to direct both sections 1981 and 1982 and the fourteenth amendment
against intentionally discriminatory actions, even though the former were
enacted independently of the latter.
However, the Hoffman and Croker courts did not actually attempt to
examine the relevant legislative history to discern the congressional intent
respecting section 1981. Instead they seized upon a similarity of wording,
and mechanically applied Davis. This approach is really just a variant of
that taken by the two courts that, when faced with a section 1981 suit against
a public official, seized upon the similarity of defendants as a reason to
apply Davis.92 Although it would be logically consistent with the decisions
in Jones and Runyon to find that congressional intent was to direct section
1981 only against intentional actions, thus giving the statute an interpreta-
tion parallel to that of the fourteenth amendment in Davis, these lower
courts took illogical short cuts and failed to determine such congressional
intent.
89. See notes 36-43, 53-59 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 238-48.
91. With respect to certain crimes, intent is an essential element according to the common
law. In other cases the legislature may expressly specify that intent must be proved. At other
times the requirement of proof of intent is derived from the intention of the legislature as
revealed through the process of statutory interpretation.
92. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
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A second illogical short cut was taken by the court in Croker. There the
court justified its application of Davis to section 1981 by stating that if
disproportionate impact could state a claim under section 1981 then "the
Supreme Court's decision in Davis would be meaningless, since section
1981 is applicable in every case in which constitutional claims of employ-
ment discrimination are asserted." '93 In a practical sense, it is true that a
decision holding intent unnecessary to state a claim under section 1981
would mean that plaintiffs would thereafter proceed under that statute rather
than under the equal protection clause. But that signifies only that the
constitutional standards have been superseded by more stringent statutory
standards; it does not render meaningless the decision that elucidated those
constitutional standards. Davis remains meaningful both as an explication
of equal protection standards and as a procedurally proper decision. With
regard to the latter it must be noted that the parties had assumed Griggs to be
controlling and thus the grant of certiorari was limited to the issue of
whether the court of appeals had misapplied that case. 94 The Supreme Court
disregarded this framing of the issue and exercised its power to "notice a
plain error not presented" by the arguments. 95 In doing so, it was not
necessary or proper for the Court to render an opinion as to the merits of the
plaintiff's section 1981 claim. 96 Thus, the argument of the Croker court is
not sound.
93. 437 F. Supp. at 1181.
94. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 238. The plaintiffs in Davis alleged that an aptitude test given to
applicants for the District of Columbia police force had a disproportionate impact upon blacks
and demanded relief under a municipal statute, section 1981 and the equal protection clause as
applied through the fifth amendment. See id. at 233. After the suit had been filed, the coverage
of Title VII was extended to include federal and state government employers. See Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to -6, -9, -13 to -17 (Supp. V 1975)). The district court, treating the suit as one
under Title VII and the fifth amendment, see Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 1, 15-16
(D.D.C. 1972), held that the test was "reasonably and directly related" to the requirements of
the police training program, id. at 18. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs'
evidence of disproportionate impact had shifted to the defendant the burden of proving that the
challenged aptitude test was job related. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959-61 (D.C. Cir.
1975). But the circuit court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the defendant had
met that burden of proof and reversed, thus granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 959, 961-65. After noting that the plaintiffs' motion had been based solely on
the claim that the test violated the fifth amendment, Davis, 426 U.S. at 234, 236, the Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court and strongly condemned the application of Title VII standards
to a constitutional claim, id. at 238-39.
95. 426 U.S. at 238.
96. The Supreme Court's usual practice is to follow the prescription of Justice Brandeis
and avoid issuing opinions that are any broader than is necessary for the disposition of the exact
questions before it. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). It is ironic that the Court disregarded this practice with respect to a different issue in the
Davis decision. After disposing of the constitutional issue, the Court went on to note that the
defendant had satisfied his burden of proving job relatedness under the standards of Title VII.
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In conclusion, it can be said that the post-Davis decisions addressing
the issue of disproportionate impact under section 1981 have reached a
plausible conclusion by an improper path. Had these courts examined the
legislative history of section 1981 they would have found that Congress was
prompted to act by a concern over reactionary white actions of the most
intentional and malicious nature. 97 Upon this finding they could have based
their decisions that unintentional disproportionate impact will not state a
prima facie case under section 1981.
The understanding of the Congress that enacted a law, however, is not
always deemed conclusive of how that law should be applied in future
circumstances. Sutherland's treatise on statutory construction states:
Legislation is often written in terms which are broad enough to
cover many situations which could not occur to mind at the time when
it is enacted. And so a statute, expressed in general terms and words of
present or future tense, will be applied, not only to situations existing
and known at the time of the enactment, but also prospectively to
things and conditions that come into existence thereafter.98
This principle has most often been applied in response to technological
change. Thus the Supreme Court has held that goods which properly fall in a
class subject to a tariff cannot be exempted because they had not been
invented or manufactured at the time of enactment. 99 Likewise, the Tenth
Circuit has held that a wrongful death statute phrased in terms of carriages
included motor trucks even though they had not yet existed when the statute
was enacted.I°0
426 U.S. at 248-52. Although this can be defended here on the ground that the courts were
dealing with competing, mutually exclusive motions for summary judgment, see id. at 234,
Justices Brennan and Marshall felt that the statutory issue should not have been reached, id. at
257 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See note 71 supra.
98. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.02, at 229 (4th ed.
1973).
Use of legislative intent as the governing criterion for interpretation has a tendency, in
general, to focus attention on circumstances and events of the time when a bill was
enacted. But circumstances and situations developing after the enactment of a statute
may be of great or even conclusive significance in determining what meaning was
conveyed. Legislative standards are often couched in general terms which are capable
of embracing and intended to embrace future applications which are not and cannot be
foreseen at the time of enactment. Therefore a statute may be interpreted to include
circumstances or situations which were unknown or did not exist at the time when it
was enacted.
Id. § 49.01, at 228.
99. See Pickhardt v. Merritt, 132 U.S. 252, 257 (1889); Newman v. Arthur, 109 U.S. 132,
138 (1883).
100. See Cain v. Bowlby, 114 F.2d 519,522 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 710 (1942)
("it is a general rule in the construction of statutes that legislative enactments in general
and comprehensive terms, and prospective in operation, apply to persons, subjects and busi-
nesses within their general purview and scope, though coming into. existence after their
passage, where the language fairly includes them").
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Justice Holmes described this principle in terms of a court's larger duty
to discover and effectuate the policy underlying the legislation. It is not
sufficient for a court to rely upon the bare language of a statute or the
examples discussed in the legislative history. If the language of the statute
fairly encompasses the situation being litigated, the court's decision must
reflect the congressional policy underlying that statute. 101 The Supreme
Court adopted this approach in dealing with changed social circumstances in
Browder v. United States. 2 In holding that a statute regulating the use of
passports applied to certain conduct even though at the time of enactment
that type of conduct was rare and thus not a focus of congressional attention,
the Court stated that "[o]ld crimes, however, may be committed under new
conditions. Old laws apply to changed situations. The reach of the act is not
sustained or opposed by the fact that it is sought to bring new situations
under its terms." 103
This method of interpreting statutes in the light of altered circum-
stances could be used to justify the application of the Griggs disproportion-
ate impact approach to cases under sections 1981 and 1982. The congres-
sional debates reveal that the purpose of the Reconstruction Era civil rights
legislation was the eradication of the badges and incidents of slavery. 104 The
badges and incidents of slavery, it may be argued, have not been eradicated
in the 1970's, but only changed in form. Former concerns over beatings,
murders and de facto peonage 05 have been displaced by confrontations with
standardized tests and minimum educational requirements. 106
Paralleling these altered social circumstances are the Supreme Court's
changing interpretations of the thirteenth amendment.107 Early decisions
101. A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the policy of the
law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases most likely to occur to
the mind. The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be,
and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and
obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of
policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate
discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not
said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.
Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (Holmes, Cir. J.); cf. Runyon, 427 U.S.
at 191 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("even if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the
Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice today").
102. 312 U.S. 335 (1941).
103. Id. at 339-40.
104. See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 296 ("the 39th Congress was intent upon establishing in the
federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular
and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves"); 36 CONG. GLOBE 474 (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull), 1151 (remarks of Rep. Thayer) ("The bill which now engages the attention of the
House has for its object to carry out and guaranty the reality of [the thirteenth amendment]. It is
to give it practical effect and force.") (1866).
105. See note 71 supra.
106. See, e.g., Griggs.
107. This change in the interpretation of the thirteenth amendment is consistent with the way
in which the Court has changed its interpretations of other constitutional provisions in response
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emasculated the amendment, restricting its scope to those deprivations of
rights that amounted to slavery or personal servitude.108 But in response to
the changing times the Court abandoned this interpretation, holding in Jones
that racial discrimination in the sale of real estate is a badge and incident of
slavery. Griggs further developed this theme, holding that poor perform-
ance by blacks on standardized intelligence tests and the lower percentile of
blacks with high school diplomas 1°9 can be linked to slavery and its perni-
cious after-effects on the educational opportunities available to blacks.110
The Griggs response to this situation is not derived from Title VII.
Title VII contains no language referring to disproportionate impact, shifting
the burden of proof, or the defense of job relatedness."' These concepts
were judicially engrafted onto the act as an evidentiary method of achieving
the purpose of Congress-which was found to be the elimination of "artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment.''1112 There is no
reason why this same approach should not be used to effectuate the congres-
sional purpose underlying sections 1981 and 1982.113
Moreover, use of the disproportionate impact theory under sections
1981 and 1982 is supported by three related considerations. First, civil
rights legislation is now recognized by the courts as being remedial in
nature114 and thus deserving of liberal interpretation to realize the benefi-
cient purposes underlying the statutes.11 Second, Title VII and sections
1981 and 1982 should be interpreted in pari materia because they have
similar remedial purposes. 116 The courts have generally given these statutes
to various societal changes. With respect to changing economic conditions and the commerce
clause, see Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). Regarding changing
technology and the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches, compare
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Note the application of changing moral
and political ideas to the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). And consider the Court's
greatly altered interpretation of the fourteenth amendment by comparing Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But see R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
108. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1833); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873). See also Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629 (1822); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876).
109. See 401 U.S. at 425-26.
110. See id. at 430.
111. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
112. 401 U.S. at 431.
113. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
114. See 3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 98, at § 72.05, at 392.
115. See id.
116. See 2A id. § 51.03. The courts have interpreted Title VII in pari materia with other
related employment statutes. See Shultz v. Local 1291, 338 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 461 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1972) ("We cannot consider as reasonable for purposes of the
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parallel interpretations in matters of substance. 117 And finally, Congress has
impliedly consented to the reading of section 1981 in pari materia with Title
VII by refusing to amend Title VII in 1972 so as to make it the exclusive
remedy for employment discrimination. 118
The use of the disproportionate impact standard for sections 1981 and
1982 is permissible under the broad language of those statutes and is
desirable as a method of effectuating the underlying congressional purpose.
In those cases dealing with matters outside of the employment area the
courts will have to alter the Griggs job relatedness defense to fit the
particular situation. The defendant's burden in these instances should be to
prove that the challenged practice is reasonably necessary for the achieve-
ment of a legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose. 1
19
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act what would be considered an unlawful
employment practice under the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works,
330 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 474 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom.
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1973) ("It is appropriate to apply the principles
growing out of the cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to Equal Pay Act
cases, since the purpose of both Acts is to eliminate employment discrimination.").
117. See Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496
F.2d 500, 505 n.ll (6th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Buckner v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Douglas v. Hampton, 338 F.
Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1972), modified, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of
America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
118. Congress did at that time make Title VII the exclusive employment discriminatiou
remedy for federal employees. See Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820
(1976). But both the House and the Senate rejected amendments aimed at eliminating other Title
VII plaintiffs' right to sue under section 1981. See 118 CONG. REC. 3371-73 (1972) (Senate);
H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 51, at 18-19, 66. Although no courts had yet applied the Griggs
approach to section 1981, the Congress was undoubtedly aware that the two statutes had
received similar treatment by the courts. And the Congress was well aware of the significance
of the Griggs decision, which was often referred to in laudatory terms. See S. REP. No. 415,
supra note 29, at 14-15; H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 51, at 8, 20-22.
119. For example, if a bank's credit requirements were challenged as rendering a dispropor-
tionate percentage of blacks ineligible for loans, the bank could counter with evidence that
under current economic conditions such requirements are necessary to avoid undue risk of
default. A private school that requires prospective students to take a standardized test would
have to prove that the results of that test are predictive of actual school performance and that
the cutoff level selected is reasonably necessary for the achievement of the school's academic
standards. See Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination
and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REV. 412, 432 (1976), describing the proposed
defendant's burden with essentially the same effect.
A situation that must be distinguished is one involving the use of quasi facially neutral
practices-practices that are so riddled with subjective factors that their use must be viewed as
an individual wrong rather than a societal wrong. An example of this is the purportedly neutral
procedure for gaining admission to a private club. Usually this includes filling out an application
giving personal and family data, obtaining the recommendation of one or more current members
and being interviewed by members of the membership committee. If a rejected applicant were
to file suit alleging discrimination, the normal response would be the claim that the applicant
simply had not met the club's standards and that those standards were applied equally to all
applicants. But such standards as congeniality and adequate social standing are inherently
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IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Congress that originally enacted sections 1981 and
1982 was to give practical meaning to the emancipation commanded by the
thirteenth amendment. That purpose has not yet been achieved-racial
discrimination remains with us today, often assuming subtle forms quite
difficult to detect. The shifting burden of proof present in the disproportion-
ate impact approach is a powerful weapon in the struggle to eradicate the
vestiges of slavery. When the discrimination at issue is a facially neutral
practice, the disproportionate impact approach is an appropriate and fair
method of reconciling the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant and
society as a whole.
subjective, as are the other elements of the admission process. Merely lumping all of these
subjective factors together and calling the aggregate a procedure does not create a facially
neutral practice such as a standardized test. The latter operates disproportionately because of
the historically inferior educational opportunities of blacks-a societal wrong. The former has a
disproportionate impact due to the subjective desire of the current membership to exclude
minority applicants-an individual wrong. Thus the membership rejection should be dealt with
as a case of disparate treatment. Proof that this allegedly neutral admissions process had
operated to exclude all minority applicants would simply be evidence-albeit strong evidence-
of the defendant members' subjective discriminatory intent.
This analysis assumes that the club is truly private, rather than a mere camouflage for public
discrimination, as in Tillmann v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In
Tillmann the Court specifically refused to reach the question of whether the Title VII private
club exemption applies under section 1981. Because of the Court's treatment of the two statutes
in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), holding that Title VII had not
restricted or repealed section 1981, the better view is that the private club exemption of Title
VII should not be applied under section 1981. See Note, supra note 54, at 1452.
The more difficult question is whether truly private clubs have a constitutionally protected
right to discriminate based upon the right of association. See generally Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175-
79; Note, supra note 54, at 1452.
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